Treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany (with agreed minute). Signed at Moscow on 12 September 1990
The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their declarations that peace will emanate from German soil. Accoring to the constitution of the united Germany, acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, espacially to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional and a punishable offence. The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare, that the united Germany will never employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its constitution and the Charter of the United Nations.
(1) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their renuncation of the manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. They declare that the united Germany, too, will abide by these commitments. In particular, rights and obligations arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 will continue to apply to the united Germany. […]
(2) The united Germany shall have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs. […]
State sovereignty has been a fundamental pillar of modern international law for more than 100 years. It stands for independence with respect to other states and for self-determination and self-government internally. This principle is supposed to prevent interstate wars because it limits the power of powerful states and protects smaller ones from the arbitrariness of others. The fact that this principle is increasingly violated in practice does not speak against this principle of international law, but rather for a crisis of the international order. One cause is the claim to power of supranational organisations that question the right to self-determination for supposedly factual reasons (climate, energy, migration, health, etc.).
At the end of the Second World War, Germany completely lost its sovereignty for around 10 years. A first step towards returning to the international community was joining the UN in 1973, a second was reunification in 1990: With the 2+4 treaty, the former occupying powers USA, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union gave the united Germany the “full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs”. Since this process did not represent a new beginning for both sides, a party and government elite remained in power that had come to terms with limited sovereignty for decades but was therefore unable to cope with the new challenges.
This explains the deficits in the exercise of state sovereignty in various policy areas. At the beginning of the migration crisis in autumn 2015, the federal government failed to protect its national territory as one of the three essential elements of statehood. A country that accepts illegal entry permanently loses control not only over its national territory, but also over the people and state power (cf. Jellinek 1914, p. 394 f.). Like other states, Berlin could have suspended the Schengen Treaty in this emergency. Humanitarian reasons can be ruled out as a motive because, according to the Geneva Refugee Convention, police registration is a prerequisite for refugee status.
The federal government is failing particularly conspicuously in European policy. As a federal state with a commitment to the principle of subsidiarity, it should only give priority to European regulations in limited cases. In contrast, it gives the European Commission a clean bill of health, even though its power is neither limited (separation of powers) nor democratically controlled. The European Parliament only has rudimentary rights, similar to those of the German Empire. In addition, the federal government equates the EU with Europe, which includes almost twice as many states. In doing so, it foregoes an independent European policy beyond the EU. This allowed Berlin to be drawn into a new East-West confrontation that does not serve its interests as a European middle power, but rather other influential NATO allies.
STATE TERRITORY: STATE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER A TERRITORY DETERMINED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Definition in international law:
“The legal significance of the [state] territory is expressed in two ways: negatively, in that any other power that is not subject to the state is prohibited from exercising rule without the express permission of the state; positive in that all people in the territory are subject to state rule.” (Jellinek 1914: 394, Translation: S.R.
Constitutional definition in Germany:
“According to general doctrine, the national territory includes the delimited part of the earth’s surface, the interior of the earth below, in the vertical (theoretically up to the center of the earth), the air space above and the territorial waters.
The area of national territory is determined by borders. In some cases they are based on so-called natural boundaries (sea coasts, rivers, mountain ridges). They mostly arose historically and are often contractually agreed upon. The national territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is defined in the preamble by the territory of the states. In several other regulations (for example Art 29, 115a of the Basic Law) the term ‘federal territory’ is mentioned.” (mi.niedersachsen.de, translation: S.R.)
“The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) refers to the maritime area beyond the territorial sea (also called the 12 nautical mile zone) […]. … Germany’s EEZ extends over an area of 4,461 km² in the Baltic Sea and 28,521 km² in the North Sea. [ …] From a constitutional point of view, the question arises as to whether the federal government or the states are responsible for exercising these sovereign rights granted under international maritime law.” (Bundestag, WD, 31.8.2022: 4f., Translation: S.R.)
“On March 31, 2004, the law approving the treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and France was passed, in which the center line of the Rhine – instead of the Thalweg – is defined as the border between the two states.” (www.zaoerv.de, 2006: S. 990).
♦ According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), over 2.4 million people have applied for asylum in Germany between 2015 and the end of March 2023 (bamf.de, 2023: 6). Although the recognition rate is around one percent, only 20,000 are deported per year (Anfrage BT, 2.3.2022). Most receive refugee or tolerated status. Since the start of the war in Ukraine (February 24, 2022), another million refugees arrived by the end of 2022 (handelsblatt.com, 16.2.2023). The problem is the growing number of illegal migrants, which is not recorded by any statistics but is conservatively estimated at over a million (DGAP, 26.11.2019).
♦ Despite the growing security risks, the federal government is rejecting proposals to reintroduce controls at Germany’s external borders. Lars Castellucci, SPD MP and chairman of the Bundestag’s Interior Committee, defends the government: “We stand by open borders” and accuses critics of “nationalism”. (welt.de, 28.4.2023). But as a member of the European Union, he should know how fragile the Schengen Agreement has become. Only at the end of 2022 did the admission of Romania and Bulgaria fail due to Austria’s veto with references to their unprotected external borders (euractiv.de, 12.12.2022).
♦ Instead of supporting Vienna’s demands for better protection of the EU’s external borders so that border-free movement of people and goods within the EU can be maintained, Chancellor Scholz made a U-turn towards the Merkel government. Germany supports Romania in its application for admission to the Schengen area (tagesschau.de, 3.4.2023), knowing full well that a quarter of all asylum seekers within the EU will submit their application in Germany (ec.europa.eu/eurostat, 4.5.2023).
♦ Germany does not have to be accused of violating the Schengen Agreement. Since the migration crisis in 2015, temporary controls at the EU’s internal borders have become common practice. Until recently, France made widespread use of this instrument (Riedel 2020: 24). The European Commission keeps a record of this and writes: “The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) provides Member States with the capability of temporarily reintroducing border control at the internal borders in the event of a serious threat to public policy or internal security. […] The reintroduction of border control is a prerogative of the Member States.” (home-affairs.ec.europa.eu, 1.5.2023)
PEOPLE OF THE STATE: BETWEEN DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND LEGAL EQUALITY WITH REFUGEES
Definition in international law:
“The people belonging to the state form in their totality the people of the state. […] A plurality of people under a common rule, without possessing the subjective quality of a people, would not be a state, […]. Members of the state, people in its subjective quality, are the totality of the state comrades, i.e. those who have legal claims to state power.” (Jellinek 1914: 406 f., Translation: S.R:)
Constitutional definition in Germany:
Grundgesetz, 23.5.1949, Artikel 116 (1):
A German within the meaning of this Basic Law is, unless otherwise provided by law, anyone who has German nationality or who has been accepted as a refugee or displaced person of German ethnicity or as his spouse or descendant in the territory of the German Reich as of December 31, 1937 .” (www.bundestag.de/gg, Translation: S.R.)
“Since 2000, children of foreign parents acquire German citizenship at birth in Germany if one parent has lived legally in Germany for at least eight years and has a permanent right of residence. In principle, these children must reach the age of 21 between German and… the foreign nationality of the parents, the so-called option obligation. However, the group of those subject to the option was largely restricted by the Second Act amending the Nationality Act, which came into force on December 20, 2014.. […]
The principle of avoiding multiple nationality still characterizes nationality law today. Those wishing to become naturalized must, in principle, give up their previous citizenship.” (auswaertiges-amt.de, 19.10.2022, Translation: S.R.)
“Almost 4.3 million people in Germany have another nationality in addition to German. This was the result of the evaluation of the population registers on the occasion of the census on May 9, 2011, reports the Federal Statistical Office. 690,000 people in Germany have Polish nationality in addition to German , 570,000 Russian and 530,000 Turkish nationality.” (zeit.de, 10.4.2014, Translation: S.R.)
♦ The reform of nationality law (2000) was an integration-promoting offer to immigrants to give their descendants German citizenship. But further reforms, encouraged by EU law, have weakened the option for children to choose citizenship when they come of age. As a result, the number of dual nationals increased. Figures were published for the first time in 2014, according to which around 4.3 million already had a second passport in addition to the German one in 2011 (zeit.de, 10.4.2014). However, there are currently neither concrete figures nor statements from those responsible that this trend contradicts the principle of avoiding multiple nationality (see left column) and, on the contrary, divides the German nation.
♦ The sovereign, the citizens, are kept ignorant by the authorities about the number of dual nationals, even though the issue is politically explosive: the political parties are apparently less concerned with integration than with mobilizing votes. An example of this is the parliamentary elections in Turkey. While the ruling party is calling its compatriots in the EU to the ballot boxes there (fr.de 1.5.2023), the opposition is mobilizing its supporters in Germany for a political change in Turkey. According to one MP, this is damaging, among other things, integration (derwesten.de, 24.4.2023). In addition, “German-Turks” are regularly reminded that their roots actually lie in Turkey.
♦ The German passport is attractive as a second citizenship because it promises material benefits, including EU-wide freedom of travel and settlement. Civic participation and corresponding obligations are not the top priority if dual nationals see a problem in handing over the passport of their country of origin. But German politicians encourage this utilitarianism. It is difficult to understand why dual nationals are allowed to vote in two or more countries even though they mostly live in one and pay their taxes there. A journalist refers to the democratic principle “One man, one wote” and argues that Germans cannot take part in several state elections due to their origin (zeit.de, 27.4.2017).
♦ Legislation tends to equate its citizens with immigrants. Asylum seekers receive a residence permit and basic benefits (AsylbLG). However, recognized asylum seekers receive citizen’s benefit like German unemployed people, without having previously paid into contribution-financed social security. The recognition rate is around one percent (bamf.de, 2023: 11). But there is already a public debate about a “blanket recognition of asylum seekers” (faz.net, 5.5.2023). This rule already applies to Ukrainians: Since the middle of last year, they have been receiving citizen’s income without applying for asylum and have access to the health system (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2023). At the end of 2023, their number exceeded the million mark, and depending on the course of the war, it could quickly multiply.
STATE POWER: POLITICAL ELITES PUSH THE SOVEREIGN AND HOLDER OF STATE POWER FROM PARLIAMENT
Definition in international law:
“Sovereign state power is therefore a power that knows no higher power than itself; It is therefore at the same time independent and supreme power. The first characteristic appears predominantly externally, in the dealings of the sovereign state with other powers, the second internally, in comparison with the personalities assigned to it. But both characteristics are inextricably linked.” (Jellinek 1914: 475 f., Translation: S.R.)
Constitutional definition in Germany:
Grundgesetz, 23.5.1949, Artikel 20:
“(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.
(2) All state power comes from the people. It is exercised by the people in elections and votes and through special legislative, executive and judicial bodies.
(3) Legislation is bound to the constitutional order, executive power and jurisprudence are bound to law and order.
(4) All Germans have the right to resist anyone who attempts to abolish this order if no other remedy is possible.” (bundestag.de/gg, Translation: S.R.)
“n Friday, November 25, 2022, the members of the German Bundestag approved the compromise of the mediation committee on citizens’ income. In a roll-call vote, 557 members voted for a corresponding resolution recommendation from the mediation committee (20/4600). 98 members voted against the proposal and two abstained. […]
The Mediation Committee’s recommendation for a resolution includes, among other things, the following changes to citizens’ income: The six-month, largely sanction-free trust period at the start of receiving citizens’ income will no longer apply. Instead of just ten percent, standard benefits should be reduced in stages by up to 30 percent right from the start.
The previous waiting period of two years will be shortened to one year. During this time, the appropriateness of the apartment and assets should not be checked. In the future, the protected assets will only be protected against crediting up to 40,000 euros (instead of 60,000 euros).[…]” (bundestag.de, 25.11.2022, Translation: S.R.)
“In North Rhine-Westphalia in September 2022 […] 1.55 million people received social assistance or Hartz IV. 47 percent – almost half – of them were foreigners. Yet they only make up a good 14 percent of the population.” (bild.de, 20.2.2023, Translation: S.R.)
♦ Over the course of 2022, the German social system was drawn into a fratricidal war between states to which we have no obligation in terms of alliance policy. Dangers for social security were left out of the discussions on the Citizens’ Income Act. The political controversy was perceived by the public as a dispute between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. However, the compromise solution of November 25, 2022 (see left column) did not meet democratic criteria: This would have included informing the sovereign about the full extent of the increasing social spending as a result of increased immigration. After all, he is the only person who has paid into the social security funds and has to pay taxes on the work he has done to cover the additional costs incurred.
♦ The warnings put forward by opposition parties that citizens’ income would lead to the worse situation of German social welfare recipients and pensioners were labeled in advance by the media as “false claims” (mdr.de, 8.11.2022), without refuting the arguments presented, let alone discussing them beforehand. Only after the reform came into force did the mass media speak out with headlines that increased sales, according to which half of the social welfare recipients in North Rhine-Westphalia were already foreigners (see left column,, bild.de, 20.2.2023). This information policy, not factual objections from elected opposition politicians, is now causing the predictable social explosiveness.
♦ The motives for a government that so disregards the sovereign’s interests in maintaining its social security are easy to name: since January 1, 2022, there has been a lobby register that says a lot about the state of German democracy. Since the obligation to disclose lobbying work in the Bundestag, the number of registered associations has doubled (das-parlament.de, 11.7.2022). Today, 5,861 associations with 31,762 people have access to the Bundestag to represent their interests (lobbyregister.bundestag.de). Statistically, there are 8 lobby associations or 43 registered lobby representatives for every elected representative.
♦ The first place in spending on lobbying in the Bundestag is the General Association of the German Insurance Industry with around 15 million (2021), followed by the Danish Ramboll Management with 12.6 million (2022). The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation spent around 5.7 million in 2021, more than the German Association of Research-Based Drug Manufacturers with 3.7 million (2022) or Bayer AG with around 2 million. Lobbying also secures foreign companies direct influence on German representatives. This also applies to foreign cultural associations, both from EU countries as well as from Ukraine and the Middle East. They have privileged access to legislative procedures compared to the sovereign.
♦ A (short) list of those lobby associations that even have a house ID card for the Bundestag is kept secret (abgeordnetenwatch.de, 16.4.2021). This means that more than 200 clubs can apparently meet undisturbed with members of parliament and discuss legislative initiatives. After the end of their political career, a job in business, in associations or in social management is available for some people (spiegel.de, 22.1.2020). The sovereign is allowed to cast his vote on a rotating basis for MPs who he does not know whether they will refuse the offers of the lobby associations.
THE EU HAS NO SOVEREIGN – ITS POWER KNOWS NEITHER SEPARATION OF POWERS NOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
Example 1: Future programme of the SPD:
“4.0. Sovereign Europe in the World
The unity of Europe is an achievement of civilisation. It is our common chance for a better future in the 21st century.
Only with a solidary and sovereign EU are we able to help shape tomorrow’s world and move closer to our vision of a democratic, just and sustainable future.” (SPD-Zukunftsprogramm 2021: 55, Translation: S.R.)
Basic Programme of Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen:
“Our fixed star for the further development of the European Union is the Federal European Republic with a European Constitution. […] We want to use it [i.e. the conference on the future of Europe] for the next phase of European integration on the way to the Federal European Republic Republic and to formulate European responses to the major challenges. The results of the conference are to be implemented within the framework of European legislation, including treaty changes.” (Grünes Bundestagswahlprogramm 2021: 162, Translation: S.R.
“The European Commission is building a strong European Health Union, in which all EU countries prepare and respond together to health crises, medical supplies are available, affordable and innovative, and countries work together to improve prevention, treatment and aftercare for diseases such as cancer. […]
Key actions […]
European Health Data Space
The newly-launched European Health Data Space, one of the central building blocks of the European Health Union and a milestone in EU’s digital transformation, […].”
♦ Many parties in Germany keep the sovereign in complete ignorance about the political system of the European Union (EU) and impose their ideology on reality. For example, the SPD’s future programme (2021) speaks of a “unity of Europe”, although it already became fragile with the Brexit and has become a distant prospect since the Ukraine war (cf. left page). The SPD is striving for a “sovereign EU” without naming the price: the renunciation of further national sovereignty rights in areas such as health, migration and foreign policy. But the EU is not a state in international law terms: it has neither its own territorial power of disposal (e.g. over the EU’s external borders) nor a sovereign, i.e. a state people. The supranational EU institutions have only rudimentary state power.
♦ The basic program of Alliance 90 / The Greens wants to remedy this deficit and transform the EU into a “Federal European Republic” (left column). Such a statehood requires the surrender of the sovereignty of all EU members and means the replacement of national constitutions. The Basic Law puts a stop to this concern by defining the German people as an “equal member in a united Europe” (www.bundestag.de/gg). The sovereign does not want to give up for Europe, but wants to be a part of Europe. The concern to make Union citizenship European “nationality”, (Grünes Bundestagswahlprogramm 2021: 213) therefore contradicts the Basic Law.
♦ What happens when sovereign rights are transferred? National parliaments would no longer have the right to transparency, say or object in legislative processes. For example, since the Corona crisis, the EU has wanted to acquire competencies in health policy that were previously only available to the member states. Using its right of initiative, it can initiate or simply enact laws. In this way, she founded the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in 1993, which today decides on the approval of new drugs. Further agencies are planned (see left column), for example to collect the health data of all EU citizens. Nobody can control these agencies today, not even the European Parliament. Example: To date, the Commission has successfully refused to disclose the contracts with vaccination manufacturers (berliner-zeitung.de, 14.2.2023).
THE TRANSFER OF NATIONAL COMPETENCES CAN LEAD TO A COMPLETE LOSS OF CONTROL
EU competencies in monetary policy
“1. The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas:
(a) customs union;
(b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market;
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro;
(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy;
(e) common commercial policy.” (VAEU 2016, Art. 3).
European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
“Article 35 – Immunities of persons
1. In the interest of the ESM, the Chairperson of the Board of Governors, Governors, alternate Governors, Directors, alternate Directors, as well as the Managing Director and other staff members shall be immune from legal proceedings with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity and shall enjoy inviolability in respect of their official papers and documents..” (ec.europa.eu, 1.2.2012)
Taxpayers’ Association (BdSt) criticises ESM Treaty
“Germany has unlimited liability
The BdSt makes it clear that the ESM Treaty is not intended to establish a rescue package, but rather a “mega-bank”. Its highest and most powerful body is the so-called Board of Governors, which is made up of the finance ministers of the Euro states.
The ‘approved share capital’ of this bank is initially 700 billion euros, of which 80 billion are to be paid in directly and 620 billion can be accessed at any time. The German share is over 27 percent. That’s more than 190 billion euros.” (lto.de, 15.6.2012, Translation: S.R.)
♦ Today Brussels only has exclusive competences in four areas: competition policy, monetary policy, fisheries and trade policy (VAEU 2016, Art. 3). In these areas, the European Commission alone can decide on legislative initiatives. A look at the development of these policy areas is instructive and should be discussed more widely publicly. In short, it can be said that institutions that are no longer controlled by a system of separation of powers, such as the supranational institutions of the EU, tend to evade the legal system entirely.
♦ Just as the Corona crisis was intended to pave the way to a European Health Union, the Greek crisis served to introduce the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Here too, small steps led to the goal: Greece was admitted to the euro area in 2001 despite a lack of prerequisites, the first warning signs (2004) had no consequences until the EU Commission quickly withdrew control of the Greek government’s finances when the crisis broke out in 2010. A new “Euro rescue package” should first be temporarily available to all over-indebted Euro states and then permanently with the introduction of the ESM.
♦ Due to the lack of fiscal policy competences at the supranational level – in democracies the parliament has budget sovereignty – the Euro states have concluded a new ESM treaty that exists outside of national and EU law (ec.europa.eu, 1.2.2012). The ESM acted like a bank. It has a share capital of 700 billion euros, of which Germany holds 27 percent and is liable for the same amount. The ESM Board of Governors made up of the finance ministers of the Euro states can increase the liability amount without limit, e.g. in the event of insolvency of members. In addition, it may take out further loans on the capital market with the consent of 2/3 of its members.
♦ The Taxpayers’ Association describes the ESM as “a kind of self-empowerment law” (www.lto.de, 15.6.2012), because it gives the Board of Governors a level of power that is outside of law and order. He presumes to determine the financial policy of the borrowing country, which in democratic states is reserved for parliaments. All warnings of undesirable developments were pushed aside, and yet some came to pass: at France’s insistence, the ESM was mobilized to pay Corona aid without examining the risks such as an increase in inflation (reuters.com, 24.3.2020, Riedel 2021/6: 15).
THE EU IS NOT A STATE – YET THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GIVES PRIORITY TO AN “EU FOREIGN POLICY” OVER NATIONAL INTERESTS
“13. Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy
The Conference underlines that the provisions in the Treaty on European Union […] do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international organisations. The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common Security and Defence Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States. It stresses that the European Union and its Member States will remain bound by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, by the primary responsibility of the Security Council […].“ (VAEU 2016, Art. 101-106, VEU 2016 Art. 24).
Heinrich-Böll-Stitung: “Dare more Europe”
“Russia’s attack on Ukraine has triggered enormous pressure to act in Germany and Europe, namely to not only support Ukraine but also quickly invest in their own risk provisions. This presents an opportunity to intensify European integration in at least four areas: security, energy, migration and technology policy. Strengthening the resilience of the EU in these four areas would advance two core green concerns: the further transfer of national competencies to Brussels and the increase of the European Union’s strategic ability to act.” (boell.de, 2023, Translation: S.R.)
Security Council: Sabotage of Nord Stream Pipeline, 27.3.2023
“By a vote of 3 in favour (Brazil, China, Russian Federation) to none against, with 12 abstentions [USA, United Kingdom, France, Malta, Switzerland, etc.], the Council rejected the draft resolution, owing to a lack of sufficient votes in favour . The resolution, if adopted, would have requested the Secretary-General to establish an international, independent investigation commission to conduct a comprehensive, transparent and impartial international investigation of all aspects of the act of sabotage on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines — including identification of its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.“ (press.un.org/en, 27.3.2023)
♦ Article 24 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) speaks of a “responsibility of the Union” in the common foreign and security policy, represented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VEU 2016 Art. 24). In the small print, however, it is stated that the member states have not ceded any of their national sovereignty in foreign and defence policy (cf. left column). Commonality at EU level is achieved through cooperation and consensus-building, which must be unanimous and is represented externally by the EU High Representative (cf. left column). He has no powers of his own. Nevertheless, German media, science and education portals misleadingly speak of an “EU foreign policy”, of a “complicated juxtaposition of supranational and intergovernmental action” (bpb.de, 17.12.2020, Translation: S.R.)
♦ The deceptive image of an EU foreign policy that oscillates between national and European law is intended to make the sovereign believe that it has already ceded its foreign policy competence – the core of national sovereignty – to Brussels. The war in Ukraine is an opportunity for such a “quantum leap in European integration” (www.boell.de, 2023, left column). However, according to the current legal situation, this would be a leap into the void. He would only be able to achieve his goal with another treaty, similar to that of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM, see above), which is independent of national and European law. The German political scientist Ernst Fraenkel coined the term dual state. He described it as an instrument of the National Socialists to transform the Weimar Republic into a dictatorship (Riedel 2020: 13).
♦ An example of the importance of a sovereign foreign policy is the act of sabotage on the Nord Stream pipelines (September 26, 2022). Because “natural gas is the most important energy source for industry and private households” (destatis.de, 21.7.2022), it was an attack on the energy security of German industry and German citizens. Surprisingly, the Bundestag has not (yet) set up a cross-party commission on this, as was the case with the attack on September 11, 2001 in the USA. The investigation is carried out by the Federal Prosecutor General, who is bound by instructions to the Federal Minister of Justice (Bundestag, WD 11.5.2022). It also needs to be explained that Germany’s closest EU and NATO allies in the UN Security Council have not supported an independent international investigative commission. If Germany had already ceded its sovereignty in foreign policy to another body, none of these questions would have arisen.
press.un.org/en, 27.3.2023, United Nations, Security Council Rejects Draft Resolution Establishing Commission to Investigate Sabotage of Nord Stream Pipeline, in: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 9295TH Meeting (PM), SC/15243, .
reuters.com, 24.3.2020, Frankreich drängt Deutschland – ESM für Corona-Hilfen öffnen.
Riedel 2021/6, Sabine Riedel, in: Analytische Perspektiven in der Corona-Krise. „Verschwörungstheorien“, Maoismus, Strukturanalyse, Moderne Geldtheorie, Bio-Macht und (Trans-)Humanismus, in: Forschungshorizonte Politik und Kultur, Volume 5, 2021/6, 2021 May 10, 30 pages.